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This essai provides a general insight into the contro�
versies examined in the realm of legal philosophy.  Those 
who have been exposed to this challenging path, realize 
that traveling it requires understanding the historical set�
tings, as well as the detailed analysis of the conceptual and 
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argumentative content of specific theoretical positions and 
debates. From the outset, it is important to bear in mind 
that learning legal philosophy requires an individual effort 
to understand the historical and current ideas and practices 
committed to determining the role and extent of the law. 
Advancing in such a path, posits to both the student and the 
researcher a challenge to come to terms with what philoso�
phers of law think and teach about the law in democratic 
settings.  But the task should not be reduced to an isolated 
experience, devoid of thoughtful and even material engage�
ment in the concrete scenarios in which fundamental and all 
too often subtle issues and questions are raised concerning 
the law.  Accordingly, it should not come as a surprise that 
we emphasize the problems depicted in the nonpositivists 
considerations of contemporary legal philosophy.  �ndeed, 
we dwell on the concept of law itself, and address issues 
regarding the philosophical inception of law as an object of 
thought.  Such topics constitute the classical approaches to 
legal philosophy. 
Given the general perspective that informs our exercise, 
the account will be compelled to choose priorities and objec�
tives, so as to be able to uncover and focus upon what we 
will contend to be of the essence.  Traditional and contem�
porary questions will emerge, and some will have to be left 
unanswered.  The need to choose –as such a methodological 
decision� should not be taken for granted.  �nevitable as it 
is, in theoretical work, exclusion is always a risk; the quality 
of which can form and shape, in due course, a responsible 
intention, enabled through communication and argument. 
So, before tackling the specific controversies in philosophy of 
law, we think it is useful to put forward a few words on the 
very concept of �philosophy of law”; because, it is a funda�
mental intellectual framework that students and researchers 
are called upon to engage, only then can their options and 
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positions assume risk and acquire meaning.  �n that direc�
tion, we are obliged to consider the conceptual distinction 
implicit in the two angles that operate therein: the law of 
the philosopher and the law of the jurist.  Accordingly, we 
will dwell first on the perennial question of the definition of 
law – the ontological question –, and then we will turn our 
attention to the way one can know the law – the epistemo�
logical question. We will try thereafter to define the law in 
the context of the �ought” (teleology) – the question of the 
natural law or the ideal of law.  And finally, of course, we will 
analyze the particularly uneasy question of ethics and law. 
2.  An approximation to the concept of philosophy 
of law
Generally, when we review the concept �philosophy of 
law”, its object is, for philosophers of law, not �the notion of 
law” properly said.  Usually, a philosopher of law does not 
make a living as a practicing lawyer or a judge, and should it 
be the case, his discourses will be situated on a philosophical, 
that is, a universal level.  �n this sense, legal philosophy is not 
concerned with considerations related directly to the practice 
of law.  To be sure, it often makes use of commonly acknowl�
edged general considerations, which are independent of law 
and do not, normally, advance the sort of analysis geared 
toward clarifying the current state of legal norms: validity is 
normally implicit within what should be appreciated as law. 
�n other words, it’s wise to take care of the separation of work 
between those who write legal dogmatic (or the doctrine of 
law) and those who do philosophy of law. Confusion on this 
foundational level is counterproductive philosophy, even if 
this is done in reference to the concept of �positive law”! �t 
is thus advisable to point out that the philosophy of law is 
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different from any treatment of law within a positivist frame�
work, from any approach handling law or any phenomenon 
related to the reign of law as a scientific object, as this is 
understood in legal anthropology, the sociology of law, the 
history of law, among others. These legal sciences are also 
somewhat consideration�oriented, and remote with regard 
to the object of law, which they view as �given,” as part of a 
factual world. But unlike these legal sciences, which can be 
evaluated according to descriptive criteria, the philosophy of 
law has law as its object of thought. �n other words, it lays it 
out in the �mind.” Thereby, the philosophy of law remains 
fundamentally universal in its design.
Now, let us turn towards the two angles that are im�
plicit in such a concept of philosophy of law. We should 
keep in perspective that the philosophy of law can be defined 
from both a philosophical and a legal standpoint, as the law 
of philosophers or as the law of lawyers. 
The first angle, generally adopted by philosophers by 
profession (as well as by vocation), is characterized by the 
philosophical investigation of the object of law starting from 
a philosophical position that can be a school of thought, 
a system, a method, an issue, or a philosophical concept, 
among others. �n general, and surely as a tendency, the law 
becomes here the application of the philosophical position, 
thereby showing that the position itself can be adequately 
used to equally clarify one’s way of conceiving law. �n this 
way the philosophy of law worked out by philosophers often 
prone the development of an axiomatic system in order to 
explain their views about �law”. 
The second angle is generally adopted by jurists who 
feel the need for more basic thoughts about law. The ground 
for such an approach rests above all upon their experience, 
which determines the breath of their thinking on the subject. 
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The trend known as �juristic philosophy,” as well as the one 
that several authors call �the general theory of law,” often 
curbs philosophical considerations because the latter is used 
only to legitimate specific positions relating to the concept 
of positive law itself. Consequently, the jurists’ philosophy 
is characterized by a marked concern for legal doctrine or 
legal dogmatic, and by the effectiveness of the procedures 
and mental patterns which it proposes. Nevertheless, this is 
a constructive reflection that lacks rigour.
When taken separately, these two angles favour a 
superficial analysis of the philosophy of law: to study the 
philosophy of law without �philosophy” or without �law” 
would betray to some extent the one as well as the other! �n 
fact, these two distinct angles clearly show the rupture at 
the heart of the philosophy of law.  �n fact, it is similar to the 
debate surrounding the nature of �God”.  Recall the classic 
and ongoing polemic between philosophers and theologians: 
the �God” of philosophers does not require any act of faith, 
it is a �God” emanating from reason, contrary to the �God” 
of theologians who is built above any authority or reason – 
it is the �God” of faith. �n the same way, the rupture of the 
philosopher’s law is utilised as a justification that works out 
the formation of a �Schematic (or Organizing) Reason” and 
of the different forms of ��dea�Law” resulting from it.  On 
the other side of the debate, the justification of the jurists’ 
philosophy of law is essentially connected to the axis of an 
equally �Schematic (or Organizing) Experience” but in their 
case by working out forms of �true” law, thus triggering the 
aforementioned quarrel. 
Although the philosophy of law is divided between 
these two perspectives, the fact remains that the creative 
energy emerging from this rupture is extremely profitable, 
because it makes it possible for the two disciplines to mobi�
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lize and then confront whatever is specific to both: behold 
the contemporary philosophy of law with all its diversity 
and richness. 
We are however personally of the opinion that the 
next turn in the philosophy of law ought to be done by giv�
ing up any �schematic” or �organizing” claim, both from a 
philosophical and from a legal perspective, so as to allow the 
development of the philosophy of law between the concepts 
of �Reason” and �Experience”.  �n this article, this perspec�
tive can only be indicated, and its full development should 
be the object of a future essay2.
3. The ontological question
First, the philosophies of law generally examine the 
question, or simply make an inquiry into what law �is.” 
This inquest requires a careful examination about the es�
sence of law beyond the notion of legal positivism. A short 
incursion into the history of the philosophy of law suffices 
to discover that for a long time this has been a fundamental 
question.  Historically, law was conceived either as being 
2 Cf. Bjarne Melkevik, Horizons de la philosophie du droit, Paris, L’Harmattan et 
Québec, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1998 (2004); idem, Réflexion sur 
la philosophie du droit, Paris, L’Harmattan et Québec, Les Presses de l’Uni�
versité Laval, 2000; idem. Rawls ou Habermas : Une question de philosophie du 
droit, Québec, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2002; idem, Considérations 
juridico�philosophiques, Québec, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2005; 
idem, Tolérance et modernité juridique, Quebec, Les Presses de l’Université 
Laval, 2006. In arabic language : أضواء على فلسفة القانون: إسهام في بناء 
مشروع قانوني»حديث» » [Ada ala falsafat alqanoun : Isham fi binaa machrou 
qanouni hadith /Lumière sur la philosophie du droit : contribution à la 
construction d’un projet juridique moderne], Éditions Al�Najoie et l’Asso�
ciation libanaise de philosophie du droit,  Beyrouth (Liban), Traduction by 
Georges Saad and al.,  2007 ; idem, «نصوص في فلسفة القانون » [Nusûs 
fî falsafat al�qânûn/Textes de philosophie de droit], Beyrouth, Édition Al 
Najoie et l’Association libanaise de philosophie du droit, Traduction by 
Georges Saad et al., 2005.
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in �the things” or in �the minds”3.  Consider the Ancients 
defence of an understanding of law as a �Verb”, whereas the 
Moderns lean toward an understanding of law as a �Subject”. 
Aristotle views law as an art. For him, as for Roman 
lawyers, law is essentially synonymous with communica�
tive justice. �t is an art which consists in determining, in 
an orderly city, what is truly due to each citizen. Thus, law 
becomes part of the structure of the city and represents the 
word of justice, firmly rooted in the political community. If 
this �Verb�Law” is characterized by Aristotle through the 
existence of a well�ordered city or society, for other ancient 
philosophers, its essential characteristic remains the cosmo�
logical nature or the world of ideas. 
The lesson to be learned from modern philosophy of 
law is to be found on the concept of �Subject�Law,” which, 
of course, identifies law with the philosophical construction 
of a subject and its intrinsic qualities such as autonomy, dig�
nity, will, etc. The German philosopher Kant is considered 
to have worked out the most sophisticated of the systems 
of �Subject�Law”. By identifying law with a philosophical 
subject understood as self�legislating will, Kant submits law 
to the court of reason and hence infers a postulate of the a 
priori reason of these subjects. The ontology of law joins here 
the metaphysics of subjects.
3 See Michel Villey, �Le droit dans les choses”and Paul Amselek, �Le droit 
dans les esprits,” in P. Amselek and C. Grzegorczyk, Controverses autour de 
l’ontologie du droit, Paris, PUF, 1989, p 11-26 et p 27-49. (Paul Amselek and 
Neil MacCormick (dir.), Controversies about Law’s Ontology, Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1991).
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�n the contemporary philosophy of law, the controversy 
between �Verb�Law” and �Subject�Law” still persists. And it 
should be specified that this controversy is often paralleled 
to theories which pretend to be �empirical” about law.  �n 
fact, the �empirical” trends, such as the theories of A. Ross 
and H. Hart, situate the question of the ontology of law in 
the predictability of people having the competence to set 
out the law4. This last perspective swung several topics of 
the philosophy of law over to the legal sciences where the 
ontological question of law rests only on the commonly 
accepted definitions characterizing law as a set of rules or 
norms. Thus, the problem whether these are truly �empiri�
cal”, or rather �psychological” theories of law?
Given the current state of philosophy of, contemporary 
attempts to redefine the ontology of law, along the lines of 
the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, do not 
appear sufficiently relevant to us.  Consideration of the vari�
ous forms of ontology of law, like the systemic or autopoïetic 
theory5, the new theory of the institutionalization of law6, and 
other theoretical frameworks, allows one to realize that they 
simply contend that the theoretical outcomes of the past are 
not convincing, because their metaphysical horizon is not 
ours any more.
4 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, London, Stevens and Sons, 1958; H.L.A. Hart, 
Le concept de droit, Bruxelles, F.U.S.L., 1976 (H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961, 2nd edition 1994).
5 André�Jean Arnaud and Pierre Guibentif (eds.), Niklas Luhmann observateur 
du droit, Paris, L.G.D.J. 1993; Gunther Teubner, Le droit, un système autopoïé-
tique, Paris, PUF, 1993 (G. Teubner, Law As an Autopoietic System, London, 
Blackwell, 1993).
6 Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger, Pour une théorie institutionnelle du 
droit. Nouvelles approches du positivisme juridique, Paris, L.G.D.J.1992; (Neil 
MacCormick and Ota Weinberger, An �nstitutional Theory of Law: New 
Approaches to Legal Positivism, Berlin – New York, Springer, 1986). 
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Thanks to the linguistic turn, the ontological question of 
law ventures today onto new horizons, such as pragmatism. 
�t appears to us that the philosophical investment in language 
and its pragmatic use in the philosophy of law may prove 
to be much more profitable than any “ontology” has never 
been.  These new philosophical considerations could serve to 
put aside the metaphysical question of the Ancients and the 
Moderns, so as to pragmatically or �linguistically” develop 
the content and extent of the philosophy of law.
4. The epistemological question
The philosophies of law also work upon the question of 
how to obtain �knowledge” about law and what is implied in 
such �knowledge”.  �s �law” an object of knowledge? Should 
the word knowledge be used concerning a practical issue as 
�law”?  �t should thus be emphasized that considerations 
about legal epistemology necessarily refer to preestablished 
views on scientific content and rationality.  For instance, the 
legal philosophical thinking consists mainly in elucidating 
the relation between the specificity of law and the possibil�
ity of knowledge as developed by a specific epistemological 
theory. Two trends are confronted here, the epistemology of 
the observer and the epistemology of participation.
On the one hand, the legal epistemology of the observer 
is based on the paradigm of an individual who pretends that 
he (or she) �observes” his (or her) object, and according to 
scientific rules more or less established among the various 
theories of scientific knowledge, could proceed to explain 
the object itself. Today, this generally means that it is nec�
essary to identify law as a scientific object of knowledge 
before entering any process of �observation”. Concretely, 
the knowledge of law is attached to a significant aspect of 
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law, to its concepts, or the legal language in general, or even 
the psychological attitudes of legal actors. We are referring 
especially here to epistemological trends such as empiricism 
or the analytical school of philosophy7.
On the other hand, the legal epistemology of partici�
pation rests on the paradigm according to which we cannot 
�observe” law and this because it receives all of its meaning 
in a context which also defines us. Law is not “nature,” but 
�culture” and it must be recognized as such and situated in 
its practical realisation. Legal hermeneutics, as a contem�
porary philosophy of law, favours this perspective8. This 
approach also claims that in any kind of knowledge the 
person who knows is already involved. Thus the herme�
neutic perspective makes it possible for us to leave aside the 
paradigm of observation that dominates legal epistemology, 
and forces us to wonder about law from the point of view of 
the knowledge that a person can acquire in a context which 
defines him or her as well.
�n fact, the question of one or the other of these ap�
proaches is not only epistemological so as to account for 
the object of study, but it is often also implicated with 
�epistemological interests.” Thus, the epistemology of ob�
servation preaches �neutrality,” while the epistemology of 
participation takes a necessary position on the social and 
political level. 
Legal epistemology also involves an interrogation of le�
gal rationality (or the rationality engaged in the legal realm). 
For legal epistemology, the question about how to define and 
7 See Cristophe Grzegorczyk, Françoise Michaut and Michel Troper (eds.), 
Le positivisme juridique, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1993.
8 See Herméneutique et ontologie du droit, numéro thématique de la Revue de 
métaphysique et de morale, no 3, 1990, p 311�423; Patrick Nerhot, Law, 
Writing, Meaning. An Essay in Legal Hermeneutics, Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 1992.
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how to understand the type of rationality who fits best the 
legal enterprise occupies a place of first importance. It is a 
�traditional” question whose importance for law increases 
in our modern culture impregnated with perspectives of 
“scientificity,” utility, effectiveness, etc. Here, the philosophy 
of law focuses on the possible discourses of legal rational�
ity and, indeed, when Max Weber defines legal rationality 
as a rational purposeful activity, and makes this form of 
rationality the conceptual key of the understanding of law, 
he makes us believe that he is probably a very good analyst 
of the tendencies of society in his time, but as a philosopher, 
he engages this understanding of law only on the way of the 
rationalization of these means9. The success of this discourse 
on rationality allows us to understand why the philosophy 
of law is so interested in the question of the discourses of 
rationality and why this also implies our conception about 
legal modernity.
The philosophical movements that seek the intro�
duction of a concept of communicative rationality – as in 
Habermas’s case – or the revaluation and the shifting of the 
rationality known as aesthetic –a significant trend in the 
philosophy of law � bear witness to this increasing concern 
for the question of the rationality of law.
9 Max Weber, Sociologie du droit, Paris, PUF, 1988. (Max Weber, Max Weber 
On Law in Econoy and Society, Cambrigde, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1954).
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5. The question of the “ought”
The third aspect examined by legal philosophy is 
related to the question of the �ought” (or the teleology) of 
law or in legal practice. �n other words, the establishing of 
what law should be is here more exactly a search for the lege 
ferenda and the normative evaluation (or teleology) inherent 
in any question of law. Even if this question has long been 
confused with the ontological definition of law and with the 
epistemological question related to the knowledge of law, 
it seems advisable to clarify the specificity of this question 
only as an �ought” in the realm of law. �f this �ought” is 
surely related to conceptions of �natural law”, in its multiple 
variants, or of �ideal law” (and even to legal positivism if 
this includes a conception of obligation for individuals), it 
is all too fair to conclude that there is significant benefit to 
analyse this tendency in and of itself.  Today, we can affirm 
that the dividing line is located between those who seek a 
complete and global theory of law build on the notion of the 
legal �ought” and those who seek only particular reference 
marks as to this �ought.” 
We can identify the first perspective with the revival 
of the “jusnaturalist” thought. Indeed, we notice first of all 
that the natural law of the Ancients, like that of the Moderns, 
has made remarkably great strides for about twenty years10. 
Beyond the particularities of each vision, they worked out 
together the principle of the ��dea�Law”, which claims to 
explain the reality or authenticity of law. �n fact, their works 
tend towards the development of a global theory making it 
possible to evaluate and judge the existing law. �t is histori�
cally the concept of �Justice,” or simply of the �Just,” which 
was used as cornerstone in the development of this theory. 
10 See Alain Renaut and Lukas Sosoe, Philosophie du droit, Paris, PUF, 1991.
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The Moderns much sooner privileged concepts like �Rea�
son,” �Will,” �Autonomy,” �Social Contract,” and many 
others, but in general, it is the paradigm of subjective rights 
which is used as a modern ideal measurement. The last re�
mark leads us, moreover, on the track of the essentially ide�
alistic character of the formation of the modern social order, 
built on the pillar of an ��deal” meant to be accomplished. 
Secondly, we can also, examine the recourse to the 
principle of a legal �ought,” but in a much more modest way, 
as in the various trends known as �legal criticism”. �t is not 
directly a question of developing an ��deal�Law” here, but 
rather one of supposing more particularly and philosophi�
cally the existence of an ideal of law. This �ought�ideal” is 
never explicitly developed as philosophy of law but is found 
in solutions and avenues considered to be righter, more ra�
tional, fairer, more equal, more democratic, etc. Besides, we 
can observe trends known as legal criticism which make this 
normative evaluation their raison d’être, such as the move�
ment of legal feminism, and partly, the movements that are 
part of the �Critical Legal Studies Movements.”
�n several respects, the theories of natural law and those 
of legal criticism are complementary.  Both are characterized 
by their desire to mobilize the �ought” of law while referring 
to factual or contextual analyses about law. 
The question of the �ought�in�law” is often related to 
thinking about law as an institution. �t is thus a question 
that is closely related to that of knowing the nature of a 
�good institution,” such as it is worked out by political and 
social philosophy. �t seems to us that today the great debate 
dwells on the cogency of our institutions, according to an 
understanding either of �justice,” or of �just,” or of �good.” 
�Communitarians” like Sandel and Charles Taylor preach a 
justification according to the understanding of the “good,” 
whereas a liberal thinker like Rawls insists much rather on 
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a justification according to the understanding of the “Just.” 
Perhaps, the most promising courses of action will consist 
in drawing the best from these two positions, as the com�
municational theory of Habermas subtly proposes. 
6. The question of ethics and law
�f we must seek a constant concern in the philosophical 
reflection on law, it seems that it resides within the realm of 
Ethics. �t is then a question of understanding law from the 
point of view of what we must do and of the acts that we must 
advance. The followers of legal positivism are not entirely 
wrong to associate this question with the reflections about 
the �ought” of law; this association results either in a rejec�
tion of any ethical consideration (Kelsen), or in the confirma�
tion of some superposed minimal ethical rules (Hart).  For 
our purpose, we can see Ethics in �law” as a preestablished 
philosophical form of an �ought” coming from the outside. 
Ethics thus capture the question of �law” as an emanation 
of its supposed righteousness. 
Since Socrates, it has been a constant in the philosophy 
of law to insist on this fundamental question: what should be 
done? This question is thus engaged from a perspective that 
emphasizes both the agents of law and a model of norma�
tive acts. We can, in fact, understand Ethics as imposing a 
rational justification of our individual and collective choices. 
As legal actors, on the legal and social levels, we constantly 
have to justify our acts in a rational way and to clarify the 
finality of our behaviour. Consequently, the capital problem 
consists in distinguishing between Law and Ethics. As to this 
distinction between Law and Ethics, the conception accord�
ing to which ethics refers to the conscience or the interiority 
of a subject, and that law is associated with social acts or the 
externality of subjective behaviour, has long been regarded 
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as the traditional criterion. This type of explanation is more 
and more disputed and forsaken in favour of several oth�
ers. Let us mention in particular the models developed by 
Herbert Hart and Jürgen Habermas.
The current debate in legal philosophy tends, generally, 
to reactivate Ethics in law. An observer of the contemporary 
legal philosophy can only be struck by the existing antago�
nism between those who seek to instaure a fondationnalistic 
discourse about legal standards, and those who are opposed 
to it entirely. On the one hand, we observe how the legacy of 
the Enlightenment is included in the various philosophical 
projects in order to ensure the ultimate basis for legal stan�
dards. These are chiefly various forms of legal Kantianism. 
On the other hand, we notice an unfounded discourse on 
standards. This discourse easily adopts Habermas’s com�
munication philosophy, which we have examined earlier11. 
There are in fact various philosophical programs 
showcasing designs about the ethical models of social acts 
as well as on the role of justice, of the good life, and many 
others. These are considered of paramount importance for 
law since they offer us the opportunity to open our mind 
towards the various cultural horizons of law which can be, 
in many respects, so distinct from ours.
11 B. Melkevik, �Le modèle communicationnel en science juridique: Habermas 
et le droit”, Les Cahiers de Droit. vol 31, no 3, 1990, p 901�915; id., «Trans�
formation du droit: le point de vue du modèle communicationnel», Les 
Cahiers de Droit, vol 33, no 1, 1992, p 115�139 (reprinted in Jean�Guy Belley 
and Pierre �ssalys (eds.) Aux frontières du juridique. Études interdisciplinaires 
sur les transformations du droit, Québec, Geptud, Université Laval, 1993, p. 
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The fields of law and ethics are often the subject of in�
numerable debates. The ethical problems facing humanity 
thus have often direct effects on the field of law. We have only 
to think of bioethics, abortion, assisted suicide, ecology, etc.
7. Conclusion 
The contemporary philosophy of law confirms the 
initial concern for the concept of law. Crucial works by 
Kelsen (Pure Theory of Law), of Hart (The Concept of Law) and 
of Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously), do nothing but take 
up again and again the problems relating to the concept of 
law in attempting to give coherent answers. Nevertheless, 
if we must trace a certain tendency, we could affirm that the 
current scenario gives more and more weight to a norma�
tive thought in relation to other disciplines, such as social, 
political, or anthropological sciences. �n our view, the fact 
that the results of the philosophical considerations about law 
are put to the test, and thus validated, is a sign of the vitality 
of this field of reflection.
We mentioned that the philosophy of law remains a 
rather open field, offering many possibilities and bearing on 
both the current and the future legal culture of our modern 
societies. Now let us specify the range of the concept of law 
as clarified by a modern (or modernist) philosophy of law. 
This philosophical project is addressed at the legal culture 
available in a society that has made modern law the horizon 
of its choices and actions. �n fact, the sought�after goal is to 
renew and enrich this culture. We can say, paraphrasing 
Habermas that the philosophy of law pursues the goal of 
�locating and preserving the places” that are potentially 
occupied by the legal practices and theories of this culture, 
of the unfinished modern legal project.
 BJARNE MELKEVIK 53
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 102 | pp. 37-53 |  jan./jun. 2011
Lastly, we could also make a point of underlining the 
ethical and political aspects of the philosophy of law.
Let us so first stress the sense of responsibility that is 
required of any person that deals with the philosophy of 
law. The philosophy of law represents an extension and an 
enrichment of the legal culture. �t meaning as well as its role 
consist in opening new horizons to our culture. Since the 
philosophy of law is devoted to addressing the legal culture, 
it is connected with a field of the social and human life of 
major importance for all. Every philosopher of law must 
therefore evaluate the ethical implications arising from his 
or her work, choices and options are unavoidable.
The philosopher of law has a responsibility with regard 
to society. He must lend an ear to society and to the individu�
als that make it up. �njustices, oppression, ostracism, among 
other things remain always present within our modern 
societies; the international scene seems rather dark. Doing 
philosophy of law is also a commitment, a commitment for 
law, for the settling of our quarrels by means of modern and 
democratic law. 
�n this sense, the philosophy of law is characterized 
more by the horizon that it opens up and by the possibili�
ties that it contemplates than by its past, however glorious.

